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Our study investigates the outbound open innovation of firms engaged in technological venturing.
Leveraging insights from the sociology theory and innovation literatures, we clarify whether social status
helps entrepreneurial ventures overcome market imperfection and information asymmetry in out-
licensing and illustrate the importance of specific aspects of social status building in this context. We also
examine the effect of failure experiences on out-licensing. We take a dynamic view of desorptive
capacity by studying an entrepreneurial venture’s learning process, both internally, in terms of its own
technology trajectory, and externally, through inter-organizational alliances. We apply a negative
binomial model to our novel panel of 180 firms studied over an 18-year period with controls for stocks
of clinical development activities, patenting and prior licensing activities. Empirical analysis enables us
to observe the impact which the firms’ technological and development status, reputation and desorptive
capacity exert upon out-licensing volume. Prior outbound open innovation studies do not account for
the heterogeneity of technology and R&D success and failure experiences observed in our study. We also
demonstrate the contingency effect of external learning from alliances during the building-up of a firm’s
desorptive capacity, or the way in which the number of co-authoring partners in scientific publications
negatively moderates the positive effect of the number of commercial alliances on the volume of its out-
licensing deals. Our findings contribute to the understanding of external knowledge exploitation and
complement important aspects of the literatures on outbound open innovation and desorptive capacity,
offering empirically rich insights for bio-pharmaceutical firms into the drivers behind volumes of out-
licensing deals.
Crown Copyright & 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The concept of open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) has
recently gained widespread research attention (e.g., Enkel et al.,
2009; Giannopoulou et al., 2010; Groen and Linton, 2010;
Huizingh, 2011). Earlier open innovation research focused on
inbound processes, whereas outbound processes have received
less attention (Mortara and Minshall, 2011). Outbound open
innovation, such as out-licensing, is an inside-out process and
includes opening up the innovation process to external knowledge
exploitation (Mortara and Minshall, 2011). Through out-licensing a
firm not only gains economic benefits from the commercialization
of technological knowledge, but also achieves strategic nonmone-
tary benefits, including gaining access to external knowledge,
establishing industry standards, and acquiring freedom to operate
based on cross-licensing agreements with other firms (Arora et al.,
2001; Grindley and Teece, 1997).
We address recent calls in Technovation to use the concept of
open innovation to develop new insights into the processes of
knowledge creation and exploitation and integrate an open
innovation perspective in an interdisciplinary manner (Huizingh,
2011; Van de Vrande and de Man, 2011), in our case drawing upon
the literatures on social status in the market for technologies
(Arora and Gambardella, 2010; Podolny, 1993) and on the deso-
rptive capacity of firms (Helfat et al., 2007; Müller-Seitz, 2012). We
address the gap whereby despite the importance of external
knowledge exploitation for firms across different industries, out-
bound open innovation, such as out-licensing, has remained
relatively neglected. In particular, it is not clear why some firms
are able to achieve a higher number of out-licensing deals than
others, in spite of the various challenges involved and the
significant complexity and high attrition rate of this innovation
activity (Bianchi et al., 2011a; Gambardella et al., 2007).
An illustrative example from our dataset on the development of
a value capturing (revenue generating) out-licensing strategy is
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that of San Diego based Ligand Pharmaceuticals. Under CEO John
Higgins, Ligand, a firm with less than 20 employees, has been
pursuing a strategy that focuses on increasing licensing, milestone,
and royalty fees from its partners. It intends to generate more
opportunities to develop successful drugs by forging partnerships
with large pharmaceutical companies. This strategy has proved to
be a success in achieving a large number of drug out-licensing
deals, often more than 20 each year. While building partnerships
with pharmaceutical companies has contributed to the success of
the firm in securing many out-licensing deals, we ask the ques-
tion: are there any other factors that are at work in driving out-
licensing deals? The answer to this question is important, since the
capability levels of different firms in technology out-licensing tend
to differ strongly, and these differences further underscore the lack
of research on licensing capabilities which are “both relevant and
understudied” (Fosfuri and Giarratana, 2010, p. 771).
2. Research context, questions and contributions
The context of our research is the bio-pharmaceutical industry,
a fertile ground for the adoption of open innovation (Bianchi et al.,
2011a) and a sector in which outbound open innovation such as
out-licensing is of particular importance.
Out-licensing can play a critical role in accessing the diverse
sources of innovation in the new pharmaceutical R&D landscape
(Allarakhia and Walsh, 2011). It also helps in bridging the widen-
ing gap between the amount of internally generated drugs for
clinical trials by large-scale pharmaceutical firms (Paul et al.,
2010), which have commercialization needs and world-class
capabilities, and the generation of novel compounds by entrepre-
neurial bio-pharmaceutical firms, which focus on R&D-related
activities along the value chain in the bio-pharmaceutical industry
(Stuart et al., 2007). To explain the differences in the number of
new out-licensing deals secured by bio-pharmaceutical firms, we
use a longitudinal panel dataset for the out-licensing deals under-
taken by 180 publicly quoted bio-pharmaceutical firms from
Europe and North America over an 18-year period. Our empirical
testing is based on a conceptual model for the out-licensing of new
technology driven by market imperfections, information asymme-
tries, and desorptive capacity, controlling for classical issues such
as firm size and technological and clinical R&D stocks.
This paper seeks to make three contributions to the literature
on outbound open innovation. First, we seek to clarify the relation-
ship between social status in the generation of public (scientific
publishing) and private (patenting) knowledge about innovation
on the one hand and the volume of outbound open innovation
licensing undertaken by firms on the other. In doing so, we
address two questions: (1) Does social status help entrepreneurial
firms overcome market imperfection and information asymmetry
with a view to the commercialization of technological knowledge?
(2) If so, how much do specific aspects of social status building
matter?
Our second contribution from this study is that of investigating
the factors directly influencing firms’ ability to actually license out
knowledge. In this regard, we move one step beyond previous
studies on desorptive capacity (namely, Bianchi et al., 2011a) in
that we adopt a dynamic view of desorptive capacity by examining
the learning process of an entrepreneurial venture, both exter-
nally, through its inter-organizational alliances, and internally, in
terms of its own technology trajectory.
Our third contribution to the literature is on the relationship
between failure experience and the performance outcomes of
firms. The relationship between failure and performance in the
organizational literature is paradoxical: failure both improves and
impedes performance outcomes over time. On the positive side,
the literature reports a positive relationship between failure
experience and organizational transformation (McNamara and
Baden-Fuller, 1999) which improves firms’ ability to adapt to
environmental changes and improve organizational reliability
(Carmeli and Schaubroeck, 2008). However, the literature also
finds that failure experience can have negative consequences for
performance in that greater experience of firm failure is associated
with rising costs (Baum and Dahlin, 2007). Success is positively
rewarded and failure is viewed negatively by peers (Edmondson,
2011). Therefore, it is not clear how failures in the R&D portfolio of
an entrepreneurial firm affect the number of out-licensing deals it
can achieve. Our research will bring more empirical clarity to
this issue.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 3 provides
a short overview of the background to our research and theories
pertaining to it, and in Section 4 we formulate our hypotheses.
Section 5 describes our data, variables and methodology. Section 6
presents the results. Finally, Section 7 discusses the implications of
our results, summarizes our findings and suggests avenues for
future research.
3. Literature review: Outbound open innovation and out-
licensing in the bio-pharmaceutical industry
In recent years open innovation has swept through a number of
industries (Gassmann et al., 2010). Thus far, research on open
innovation processes has focused on distinguishing between the
‘outside-in’ and the ‘inside-out’ processes of open innovation,
along with their coexistence (Enkel et al., 2009).
Outbound open innovation, in particular technology out-licen-
sing, remains a challenge for most firms. A recent survey on
inventors in Europe identifies a worrying 40% attrition rate
between the decision to out-license a technology and the actual
conclusion of the deal (Gambardella et al., 2007). The difficulty in
achieving out-licensing stems from the high complexity of this
activity, which deserves detailed research attention.
Two streams of literature which are particularly rich in insights
about outbound open innovation are theories on social status in
the market for technologies (e.g., Arora and Gambardella, 2010)
and work on desorptive capacity in outbound innovation (Helfat
et al., 2007); these are discussed below.
3.1. The role of status
The characteristics of technology-intensive environments pose
specific challenges to licensing exchange, and markets for knowledge
are characterized by market imperfection and information asymme-
tries concerning the quality of the technology offered for license
(Akerlof, 1970; Zeckhauser, 1996). Uncertainty about the value of
technology hinders the development of a market for technology
(Arora and Gambardella, 2010). Limited transparency and serious
inefficiencies in the technology market impede the identification of
potential partners, and both the process of negotiation and contract-
ing with partners (Williamson, 1975). “Parties typically do not know
who owns what, and who might be interested in trading” (Teece,
1998, p. 68). No licensee firm can be aware of all technological
opportunities, let alone process all of the available information about
new technological opportunities. Even if the licensee is aware of a
certain technological opportunity, it faces a great deal of uncertainty
regarding the value and applicability of the technology in question
(Arora and Gambardella, 2010; Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Kani and
Motohashi, 2012). Licencing a technology across firm boundaries is
complicated due to cognitive, intangible, idiosyncratic and predomi-
nantly tacit nature of technological knowledge. These features
complicate disclosure of this knowledge, in addition to valuation of
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the technology for trade by both parties in a negoitation and the
process of marketing this licence (Teece, 2000).
The choice of a potential licensor is therefore overly complex
because limited information is available (Jensen and Roy, 2008).
Prior research suggests that social status, defined by the prestige
accorded to actors because of their social positions (Burt, 1982;
Gould, 2002), help simplify partner choice (Jensen and Roy, 2008).
In the choice of exchange partners, status shapes firms’ choice set
of actively considered alternatives.
Formal and informal networks have traditionally played an
essential role in compensating for the lack of market transparency
(Bidault and Fischer, 1994; Ford and Thomas, 1997). Thus, the
commercialization of knowledge assets is fundamentally social in
nature (Hoegl and Wagner, 2005; Podolny and Stuart, 1995).
Social status can serve as a sign of quality in terms of the resources
or capabilities of firms and individuals. Social status positively
affects the collective perceptions of potential partners with regard
to the focal firm and its outputs (Perrow, 1961) in particular, when
information about the firm’s actual quality or trustworthiness is
unavailable or only imperfectly observable (Jensen, 2003; Podolny,
1993, 2005; Stuart et al., 1999).
Taken as a whole, in technology markets, entrepreneurial firms
which are potential licensors may employ the strategy of building
their social status as signals to potential commerical partners that
they are trustworthy partners despite both their relative inexperi-
ence (the liability of newness) and the presence of asymetric
information on their capabilities to deliver solutions to customers
and partners (Rao et al., 2008).
3.2. Desorptive capacity in outbound open innovation
The concept of desorptive capacity is the second stream of
research from which our insights into the drivers of out-licensing
emerge. This literature merges the concepts of absorptive capacity,
which was so central to the innovation literature of the 1990s,
with the dynamic capabilities literature, which drove much of the
strategy literature of the 2000s, developing a capability-led
approach to research on open innovation. Desorptive capacity is
a type of dynamic capability as a firm purposely creates, extends,
or modifies its resource base (Helfat et al., 2007). Dynamic
capabilities can be disaggregated into sensing, seizing, and trans-
forming capacity (Teece, 2007). In the context of out-licensing,
sensing capacity relates to identifying new opportunities for
licensing. As discussed previously, the problem of information
asymmetry prevails in the technology market. Information asym-
metry runs in both directions: the licensee lacks knowledge about
the specifics of the technology, while the licensor lacks knowledge
about the market potential of the technology. Thus, a capacity for
sensing is important for identifying potential market opportunities
for out-licensing. Beyond sensing capacity, seizing capacity refers
to the act of addressing these opportunities. Transforming capacity
relates to reconfiguring a firm’s processes.
Extant research also suggests that the accumulation of deso-
rptive capacity is a learning process that requires exploitation and
exploration; whereas exploitation is associated with activities such
as “refinement, efficiency, selection, and implementation”, explora-
tion refers to notions such as “search, variation, experimentation,
and discovery” (March, 1991, p. 102). Exploration may need to
destroy cognitive barriers regarding technology and product areas
(Eggers and Kaplan, 2009) and help firms to considerably broaden
their perspective on technology commercialization opportunities.
An entrepreneurial venture can build a strong desorptive
capacity in at least two ways. The first is through alliances with
various external partners. In the context of the bio-pharmaceutical
industry, the types of partners with which a firm enters into
relationships vary substantially throughout the different phases of
the R&D process (Bianchi et al., 2011a), and the types of partners
in alliances are pathways for the exchange of resources and
signals that convey recognition (Stuart, 2000). Another way for
an entrepreneurial firm to build strong desorptive capacity in
outbound open innovation is by learning from its own technolo-
gical trajectory (Dosi, 1982). Here, innovation can be defined
as a cumulative process of incremental problem-defining and
-solving activities (Rosenberg, 1982). As many problems are firm-
specific, a firm’s learning experience is distinctive. Due to the
distinctiveness and cumulativeness of a firm’s learning experience,
its technological trajectory can be characterized as unique and
path-dependent (Dosi, 1982; Garud and Karnoe, 2002). Cantwell
(2004) has found that, even over time periods of 100 years, most
firms continue to develop competencies in technology fields in
which they gained their initial technological competencies. Con-
sequently, firms’ current technology portfolios are, at least partly, a
reflection of their past problems, interests and capabilities. It
follows that an entrepreneurial venture’s sizable R&D portfolio
may indicate its strong R&D capability and may also relate to
outbound open innovation, since a firm’s volume of technological
knowledge determines its technology transfer potential.
This brief analysis suggests that in order to explain differences
between bio-pharmaceutical firms in terms of the number of new
out-licensing deals, the framework underlying our research should
comprise two main perspectives: technology market imperfection
and information asymmetry, where firms’ social status matters,
and desorptive capacity in open innovation, where external and
internal learning is important. Our discussion leads us to derive a
number of specific hypotheses which we posit below.
4. Hypotheses
4.1. Market imperfection and information asymmetry: Social status
In the market for technologies, firms with high status enjoy
several benefits as a result of their perceived quality (Merton,
1968). First, high-status firms are more sought-after as exchange
partners because association with high-status actors also boosts
the status of the partners (Dacin et al., 2007; Podolny, 1993; Stuart
et al., 1999). High-status firms also enjoy legitimacy and respect
from others as a result of their favoured standing in the social
hierarchy (Gould, 2002). Finally, high status provides firms with
favourable access to resources such as financial capital (Stuart
et al., 1999) and human capital (Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001;
Podolny, 1993). Specifically, entrepreneurial ventures may estab-
lish status in two interrelated and yet different spheres: public and
private knowledge domains.
Achieving high status in the public knowledge domain (mea-
sured by the number of citations) and thus actively connecting to
the wider scientific community confers at least two benefits on an
entrepreneurial venture: (1) technical credibility, suggesting that
the entrepreneurial venture can convey to potential licensees that
it understands and can work with the latest scientific ideas in the
field (Zucker et al., 1998); (2) some assurance that the firm has the
ability to absorb and leverage new knowledge acquired from
outside entities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
In the private knowledge domain, biotechnology firms main-
tain key patents that can reap significant value by licensing their
intellectual property rights to other firms developing complemen-
tary technologies. A robust patent regime (such as that available to
the bio-pharmaceutical industry) enables entrepreneurial firms to
convert their research innovations into a valuable resource that
can be commercialized via out-licensing (Levitas and McFadyen,
2009). Recent research has demonstrated the link between patent
citations and the market value of a patent (Nair et al., 2011). This is
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congruent with previous research, which suggested that the
economic value of patents is highly skewed (Griliches, 1990;
Harhoff et al., 1999). Therefore, researchers now use the number
of citations that a patent receives as a proxy for the true value of
patents (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). In line with this approach,
patent citation count can be a relatively accurate indicator of
status in the private knowledge domain. A large number of patent
citations implies a high status in the private knowledge domain,
and signals to potential partners that the patents underpinning the
firm’s out-licensing activities are likely to generate positive eco-
nomic returns. We would therefore expect that firms with high
patent citations ought to complete more out-licensing deals, as
these attract commercial partners focused on capturing economic
value from the patented technology. Taking together the argu-
ments on social status in both public and private knowledge
domains and its positive relationship with out-licensing, we
expect that:
H1. For an entrepreneurial firm, social status is positively asso-
ciated with the number of out-licensing deals which the firm
secures.
4.2. Desorptive capacity
Alliances with established players can help an entrepreneurial
firm to build up technological and market knowledge necessary
for out-licensing. In particular, prior studies have suggested that
establishing alliances is an effective means of balancing and
synchronizing the exploitative and exploratory activities (e.g., sen-
sing market opportunities of technologies) required in out-licensing
(Holmqvist, 2004; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel and
Deeds, 2004). In addition, a portfolio of commercial alliances helps
the entrepreneurial venture overcome uncertainty from licensees
about its capabilities and its inexperience in developing and
transferring new technologies (e.g., seizing and transforming
capacity in out-licensing).
For entrepreneurial biotechnology firms, we distinguish between
two types of alliances located in both public and private knowledge
domains: co-authoring partners in scientific publications versus
commercial partners in drug discovery. Scientific papers are the public
dissemination of a knowledge creation process by co-authoring
partners. Drug discovery and clinical trials is a method through which
the intellectual property of partners is generated and converted into
products that can capture private economic gains. We expect that
alliances in both private and public knowledge domains may be
positively correlated with a higher number of out-licensing deals
(Cockburn et al., 1999; Pisano, 1997). More specifically:
H2. For an entrepreneurial venture, the number of commercial
alliances is positively associated with the number of out-licensing
deals which the firm secures.
H3. For an entrepreneurial venture, the number of co-authoring
partners in scientific publications is positively associated with the
number of out-licensing deals which the firm secures.
In fact, firms’ involvement in a wide array of alliances has
become a ubiquitous phenomenon in today's business landscape
(Contractor and Lorange, 2002). As a consequence, most firms
are engaged in multiple simultaneous alliances with different
partners and are facing the challenge of managing an entire alliance
portfolio (Bamford and Ernst, 2002; Gulati, 1998; Hoffmann, 2007).
Prior research implies that interdependencies can occur in alliance
portfolios (Vassolo et al., 2004) and thus have the potential to create
synergies (Powell et al., 1996). For example, access to universities
may enhance the research productivity of private firms.
However, studies on alliance portfolio management also point
to the effect of conflict, redundancy or competitive overlap
between alliances and partners in the portfolio (Gimeno, 2004;
Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Silverman and Baum, 2002). Conflict
between partners occurs when they affect one another negatively
because they are members of different knowledge domains which
may compete against each other. In the public domain the knowl-
edge produced by R&D is like a public good, which spills easily
from the innovating firm to other companies that can free-ride on
its efforts (Arrow, 1962). In the private domain there exists the
intellectual property’s innate value rivalry, thus, disclosing an idea
to some, substantially reduces its value for others (Gans and Stern,
2010). Therefore, the conflict between alliances in the public and
private knowledge domains is almost inevitable.
In addition, the simultaneous adoption of a wide variety of
alliances also triggers costs that might negatively influence the
innovation performance of the firm. Numerous alliance governance
scholars (e.g., Gulati and Singh, 1998) stress that managing alliance
partnerships requires substantial monitoring and control activity. It is
argued that as the diversity of alliances partners goes up, firms
increasingly need dedicated alliance functions to manage potential
conflicts among the different alliances (Hoffmann, 2007; Parise and
Casher, 2003).
Based on these arguments, the present study hypothesizes the
existence of a negative interactive relationship between public-
and private-domain alliances on the number of out-licensing
deals, reflecting the costs of simultaneously collaborating with
different kinds of partners.
H4. For an entrepreneurial firm, the number of co-authoring
partners in scientific publications negatively moderates the posi-
tive effect of commercial alliances on the number of out-licensing
deals which the firm secures.
The path-dependent nature of absorptive capacity is widely
acknowledged (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). To accumulate strong
desorptive capacity in outbound open innovation, a firm can learn
from its own technological trajectory (Dosi, 1982). Specifically,
a firm may benefit from its market knowledge that is developed in
its internal innovation activities. If a firm carries on a reasonably
large R&D portfolio connected to a wide variety of technology
markets, it may have a relatively good understanding of many
potential applications of these technologies.
Therefore, internal technology development and outward tech-
nology transfer are likely complementary because there may be
synergies between internal and external technology exploitation
in multiple markets. The size of an entrepreneurial venture’s R&D
portfolio may be positively associated with outbound open inno-
vation. Conversely, prior research implies that working on very
few projects at any given time may suggest weak desorptive
capacity, since working on too few ideas diminishes the spill-
overs in knowledge that can arise when several ideas interact
(Irwin and Klenow, 1994). Such spill-over effects exist only when
multiple ideas are considered simultaneously (e.g., Bluedorn et al.,
1992). Therefore, maintaining a reasonably large R&D portfolio
may be positively associated with outbound open innovation.
Desorptive capacity is built upon the learning process where both
exploitation and exploration are needed for searching for, and
discovering potential market opportunities for the technology portfo-
lio of a firm. However, exploitation and exploration are two funda-
mentally different learning activities betweenwhich firms divide their
attention and resources. Several scholars maintain that there is a
trade-off between aligning the organization to exploit existing com-
petencies and exploring new ones (Ancona et al., 2001; Levinthal and
March, 1993).
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Scholars have long believed that a well-balanced combination
of the two types of learning is essential for long-term organiza-
tional success (Gupta et al., 2006; Levinthal and March, 1993). Both
types of strategy processes compete for scarce resources. As a
result, company leaders need to make trade-offs between them
(Burgelman, 2002). Therefore, for firms with similar technological
breadth (or heterogeneity in terms of their technology portfolio),
having too many projects may be bad for desorptive capacity and
thus for achieving out-licensing deals. Theories on capacity-
sharing suggest that working on too many tasks simultaneously
causes less attention to be paid to any individual task (Navon and
Gopher, 1979). Bottleneck theories argue that when multiple tasks
need the same resources at the same time, bottlenecks arise and
all tasks are damaged (DeJong, 1993; Pashler, 1994). Cross-talk
arguments suggest that some tasks may produce outputs harmful
to the processing of other tasks (Navon and Miller, 1987). Such
deleterious effects can increase with the growing number of tasks
(Kinsbourne, 1981). Overall, these arguments suggest that proces-
sing too many tasks at the same time is likely to lead to lower
performance output in innovation (Chandy et al., 2006).
Empirically, the above arguments are also supported by the
emerging trend of licensing deals in the industry (Business
Insights, 2009). In particular, licensing deals will continue to
become more complex due to bio-pharmaceutical firms’ desire
to remain involved in their product lifecycle beyond the stages of
discovery and development. With licensing deals increasing in
complexity, obviously, processing too many tasks at the same time
is likely to lead to lower performance output in innovation.
Furthermore, recent increases in bio-pharmaceutical firms’
consolidation and convergence of domains are an indicator of
the ability of well-established bio-pharmaceutical firms to effec-
tively compete against traditional big pharmaceutical firms
(Business Insights, 2009). As a result, these bio-pharmaceutical
firms with a relatively large R&D portfolio may become less likely
to out-license their crown jewels to their competitors.
Integrating these arguments, we propose that the number of
R&D projects a firm is working on at any given time has an
inverted U-shaped effect on the number of its out-licensing deals:
H5. There exists an inverted U-shaped effect between the size of
an entrepreneurial firm’s R&D portfolio and the number of its out-
licensing deals.
5. Data
5.1. Sample, measures and model specification
Our sample resulted from a larger sample of the top 300 public
bio-pharmaceutical firms in terms of R&D clinical activity from
the Pharmaproject database. Due to our substantive interests in
the licensing behaviours of entrepreneurial ventures, we used the
following filters to come up with our final sample: the sample
firms needed to have a maximum age of less than 20 years, they
had to be listed on a stock exchange in North America or Europe,
and have data on all of our sources (see below). These filters led to
a final sample of 180 firms. We collected all the information on the
variables for the 180 firms, as illustrated by the descriptive
statistics in Table 1.
Our data were collected from five databases: Pharmaprojects is
a database of firms which have been undertaking human ther-
apeutic clinical trials since 1990; Derwent Innovations Index is a
database of patenting activity, while Research Insight is an
industry standard database for finance and accounting research-
ers; Thomson Reuters Web of Science Citations Index is a database
from which we can record the volume of publication activity and
citations of our panel of firms; LexisNexis is a database with over Ta
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12000 international news sources, from which we counted the
number alliance announcements by our firms.
One restriction of the study sample is that all firms are public.
This restriction allows us to derive firm-relevant financial infor-
mation from Research Insight, but it inhibits the generalization of
the study results to entrepreneurial ventures. To detect any other
possible biases, we further compared the 180 firms in the sample
with the other 31 randomly selected entrepreneurial biotechnol-
ogy firms for which we had gathered incomplete information.
This comparison reveals no significant differences in terms of
patent productivity, profitability, number of employees, or number
of licensing deals. However, the firms in the sample are somewhat
more R&D-intensive, as their average R&D expenditures are higher
than those of the firms that were not included in the final sample.
The different measures used in the study are discussed below.
We acknowledge that we cannot fully measure market imperfec-
tion and desorptive capacity. We lag all independent and control
variables (except firm age) by a year, as our theoretical approach is
based on the argument that the volume of current out-licensing is
driven by the previously accumulated resources and capabilities of
the firm.
5.2. Dependent variable
5.2.1. Total number of out-licensing deals
Our main interest in this study is to understand why some
firms are able to achieve a higher number of out-licensing
deals than others, in spite of the various challenges and the high
complexity and high attrition rate of this innovation activity
(Gambardella et al., 2007). Therefore, we used the aggregate total
number of out-licensing deals secured by each firm in a given year.
We collected these data from the Pharmaprojects database.
A criticism of this measure could be that it does not differentiate
the economic value of each deal. Whilst we acknowledge that our
measure does not control for this variance, economic benefits only
partially explain why firms go for out-licensing (Arora et al., 2001;
Grindley and Teece, 1997). A prior study suggests that deal value in
licensing is often determined by subjective factors, such as the
total perceived economic and technical value of the services or
products offered to the licensee (Arnold et al., 2002). Therefore,
data on the economic value of each deal can sometimes be noisy.
5.3. Independent variables
5.3.1. Status of a firm
This construct is composed of two variables: status measured
by the number of citations of scientific publications of a firm and
status measured by the number of citations of a firm’s patents. For
the first measure, we used the lagged yearly number of citations
(non-cumulative and logged) of the scientific papers published by
a sample firm. These data were collected from the Thomson
Reuters Web of Science Citations Index. For the second measure,
we used the lagged yearly number of citations (non-cumulative
and logged) of the patents owned by the firm. These data were
collected from the Derwent Innovation Index. As a robustness
check, we also used the cumulative counts of the two measures.
The results remain largely unchanged, except that the models with
non-cumulative measures have a better model fit than the
cumulative ones.
5.3.2. Number of commercial alliances
To measure this variable for a sample firm, we used the lagged
cumulative count of its announced commercial alliances from
LexisNexis.
5.3.3. Number of co-authoring institutions of scientific publications
We used the lagged cumulative total number of co-authoring
institutions with which a sample firm publishes scientific papers
each year. These data are garnered from the Thomson Reuters Web
of Science Citations Index database, which allowed us to search for
each organization and provided information on when a firm
published a paper. Papers published by an author who was not
yet a firm employee were not included in the analysis.
5.3.4. Scale of R&D portfolios
We used the lagged (non-cumulative) number of R&D projects
owned by a firm each year to measure this variable. These data
were collected from the Pharmaprojects database. As a robustness
check, we also used the cumulative count of this measure. The
results remain largely unchanged, although the models with non-
cumulative measure have a better model fit.
5.4. Controls
5.4.1. Number of patents
The number of patents held by a firm may influence the volume
of its out-licensing deals. To control for this effect, we used the
lagged (non-cumulative) number of patents owned by a firm each
year to measure this variable. To validate the robustness of the
reported results, we also used the cumulative count of this
measure. The results remain unchanged.
5.4.2. Number of patent authors
We used the lagged (non-cumulative) number of patent
authors for a focal firm each year to measure this variable. As a
robustness check, we also used the cumulative count of this
measure. The results remain unchanged.
5.4.3. Technological breadth of R&D portfolios
The breadth of R&D project portfolios can impact the total
number of out-licensing deals. To control for this effect, we used
the lagged Blau index (a measure of heterogeneity) of the patent
portfolio upon which the R&D projects of a firm are based each
year. There are 14 major biotechnology categories in the Derwent
Patent dataset. A score of 0 means that all patents upon which a
firm’s R&D is based, come from a single technological category in
the Derwent Innovation Index Patent dataset. When Blau equals 1,
there are an equal number of patents from all possible technology
classes.
5.4.4. Number of in-licensing deals
In the context of open innovation, technology transactions may
involve mutual technology transfer in both directions, and the
number of in-licensing deals may lead to a higher or lower number
of out-licensing deals. To control for such an effect, we counted the
yearly non-cumulative number of in-licensing deals of a firm.
These data were taken from the Pharmaproject database.
5.4.5. Number of failed projects
To measure this variable, we used the lagged cumulative
number of ceased projects owned by a firm each year. These data
were collected from the Pharmaprojects database. To ease the
concern that some firms may have a larger portfolio of projects,
we also measure this variable as a percentage, that is, lagged
cumulative number of ceased projects divided by the total number
of projects owned by the firm, and the results remain unchanged.
However, the model fit of count measure is better.
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5.4.6. R&D expenditure
We used the lagged yearly R&D expenditure of the firm, taken
from Research Insight.
5.4.7. Firm age
We consulted the websites of all firms in our sample to register
the year of founding and calculated the age of each firm; all data
from Pharmaprojects was then collected from the year of founda-
tion, or 1990 for firms founded prior to that year, generating a
yearly panel of data for each firm.
5.4.8. Firm size
Because the number of R&D projects a firm secures is likely to
vary depending on its size, we control for this empirically by using
the lagged total number of employees of the firm. These data were
taken from Research Insight and are updated yearly.
5.4.9. Number of R&D projects at different phases of drug discovery
The R&D process is relevant for outbound open innovation.
More specifically, in the bio-pharmaceutical industry, outbound
open innovation occurs mainly during clinical tests and post-
approval activities. In some cases, commercial exploitation may
start earlier than the end of pre-clinical tests (Bianchi et al., 2011a).
Therefore, we used lagged cumulative measures to control for R&D
projects located in different phases of drug discovery. We took
these data from the Pharmaproject database and updated them
yearly.
5.5. Model specification
For the model specification, the dependent variable is a count
variable: the yearly number of biotechnology firm’s out-licensing
deals. Because we observe over-dispersion in the data (violating
the equality of mean and variance assumption in Poisson estima-
tion) we specify a negative binomial model (e.g., Hausman et al.,
1984). Furthermore, we used the generalized estimating equations
(GEE) (Zeger and Liang, 1986) method, which is being increasingly
used to analyse longitudinal and other correlated data, especially
when they are binary or in the form of counts. Besides the seeking
of more efficient estimators of regression parameters, the main
benefit of GEE is the production of reasonably accurate standard
errors, hence confidence intervals with the correct coverage rates.
In the analysis, we mean-centred the scale of R&D portfolios
variable. To address the issues of non-normality, we log-
transformed the following variables included in the analysis:
number of patent authors; R&D expense; citation of publications;
citations on patents; and co-authoring institutions of scientific
publications. The mean variance inflation factor is 3.8, with a
maximum of 7.31, well below the threshold value of 10, suggesting
that our results are not harmed by multicollinearity (Mason and
Perreault, 1991).
6. Results
Table 2 presents our results, which we now explain in detail
before discussing the implications and limitations of this study.
Model 0 includes only control variables. There are two major
observations to be made here. First, it is interesting to highlight
that of all the different phases in drug discovery, only the number
of projects located in the pre-clinical stage correlates positively
with the number of out-licensing deals. This finding is consistent
with previous studies on optimum licensing strategies for firms in
drug discovery (Kalamas and Pinkus, 2003) and complementary to
recent industry-led thinking (Paul et al., 2010). Second, the
number of failures in R&D projects is negatively associated with
the number of out-licensing deals. This result suggests that failure
is viewed negatively by peers in licensing (Edmondson, 2011).
Success is important because failed projects are not going to
generate out-licensing opportunities in of themselves (though
scientific failure might generate reflection opportunities from
which future projects could be created). Therefore, the more
projects that fail, the less technological knowledge available for
the firm to out-license.
In addition, the results also indicate that technology transac-
tions can involve mutual technology transfer in both directions,
and the number of in-licensing deals leads to a higher number of
out-licensing deals. As discussed previously, we controlled for the
effects of number of patents and number of patent authors on the
number of out-licensing deals. These two variables are not
significant. In addition to controlling for the effect of breadth of
R&D projects, we included the effects of R&D expenses, firm size and
firm age. None of these are significant.
In Model 1 we added the two status variables status by citations
on scientific publications and status by citations on patents. This
significantly improves the model fit (ΔQIC¼586.866). The
empirical result suggests that an entrepreneurial firm’s status in
the public knowledge domain does not have significant impact on
the number of out-licensing deals. However, the higher the status
an entrepreneurial firm achieves in the private knowledge domain
(i.e., higher patent citations), the larger the number of out-
licensing deals it can secure. H1 is therefore partially supported.
The insignificant result from status in the public domain is
intriguing. The main reason for the insignificance could be that
public and private knowledge domains come from different
spheres (Arrow, 1962; Merton, 1973; Griliches, 1992). As a result,
the high status which an entrepreneurial venture can achieve in
the public knowledge domain may have little impact on how the
firm will be rewarded in the private knowledge domain (i.e.,
achieving a larger number of out-licensing deals).
Hypotheses 2 and 3 move on to consider the desorptive
capacity of an entrepreneurial venture, by examining the effects
of alliance portfolios in both private and public knowledge
domains. In this regard, we introduced two new variables in
Model 2 to test the predictions. This continues to improve the
model fit (ΔQIC¼239.097). First, to examine H2, we included a
commercial alliances variable. The result supports our prediction,
suggesting that a larger number of alliances in the private knowl-
edge domain will lead to more out-licensing deals. Second, we also
included a number of co-authoring institutions of scientific publica-
tions variable. The result does not support H3. However, this
outcome is consistent with the results of H1, where status related
to the public knowledge domain does not influence the total
number of out-licensing deals in any significant way.
H4 further examines desorptive capacity effects by including
the interaction between the two variables of alliance portfolios, in
both the private and public knowledge domains. In Model 3, we
introduced an interaction term. This further improves the model
fit (ΔQIC¼45.519). The negative sign of the interaction term
supports H4, according to which alliance portfolios in the public
knowledge domain negatively moderate the positive effect of
alliance portfolios in the private knowledge domain on the
number of out-licensing deals.
This result of negative interaction between our two desorptive
capacity measures is rather intriguing in light of the context of
open innovation. Indeed, it may reflect the risks and challenges
related to open innovation, in particular, with out-bound open
innovation of out-licensing. As discussed previously, the negative
interaction effect finds support from at least three streams of
literature in the domains of intellectual property, the market for
technology as well as the literature on alliance management.
In addition, the negative effect is also consistent with many
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empirical observations of the actual conflicts between partners
from the public and private knowledge domains. Major issues have
been described in detail in a recent commentary on this topic.
Gray (2006) captures the essence of the conflict between research
collaborations that involve universities, who are primarily focused
on generation and dissemination of public knowledge, and com-
mercial partners, who are primarily focused on the generation of
knowledge that can capture private economic returns. Gray (2006)
observes that “…industry’s need to protect intellectual property
may run counter to the open-access model of resource sharing
encouraged in academia once discoveries have been published.”
Furthermore, “the increased investment in academia by industry
has raised numerous concerns that the potential imposition of
corporate secrecy and drive for profits is at odds with academic
culture… Many corporate grants come with a requirement for
publication delay to allow internal review and filing for patent
protection when deemed necessary or desirable… More troubling
is the extension of intellectual property rights and the associated
restrictions beyond the research actually funded by the company.
Some agreements have allowed the industry partner to ‘cherry
pick’ a subset of new inventions generated by an entire academic
department regardless of whether the discovery was made by a
funded investigator”(Gray, 2006, p. 652).
To achieve successful partnerships, the differing cultural and
economic needs that exist in both the public and private knowl-
edge domains need to be accommodated. Specifically, for industry,
a straightforward and transparent structure for corporate arrange-
ments that defines acceptable parameters for confidentiality,
handling of intellectual property, financing and conflict resolution
are important. For academia, they need to balance a culture and
duty of public disclosure of knowledge through publication against
commercial partner’s need to capture proprietary intellectual
property that can eventually be commercialized (Gray, 2006).
Unless these conflicts are resolved, portfolios in the public knowl-
edge domain may negatively moderate the positive effect of
alliance portfolios in the private knowledge domain on the
number of out-licensing deals.
H5 further refines our hypothesis on desorptive capacity by
predicting the learning effect arising from the scale of the R&D
portfolio of entrepreneurial firms. In Model 4, both the linear and
Table 2
Results of regression—drivers of out-licensing deals.
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Control variables
No. of patents 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
No. of patent authors 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Breadth of R&D project 0.264 0.059 0.010 0.020 0.105
(0.230) (0.265) (0.276) (0.271) (0.278)
No. of in-licensing deals 0.047nnn 0.035nn 0.039nn 0.030n 0.016n
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009)
No. of failed projects 0.002nn 0.006nn 0.005nn 0.002nn 0.008nn
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
R&D expense 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm age 0.016 0.011 0.009 0.014 0.013
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Firm size 0.010 0.081 0.150 0.131 0.084
(0.145) (0.154) (0.163) (0.159) (0.160)
No. of Phase 1 project 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
No. of Phase 2 project 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
No. of Phase 3 project 0.021 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.009
(0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
No. of preclinical project 0.017nnn 0.016nnn 0.012nnn 0.012nnn 0.009nn
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Market imperfection and information asymmetry
Status (citations of publications) 0.027 0.047 0.071 0.029
(0.039) (0.071) (0.071) (0.073)
Status (citations of patents) 0.257nnn 0.260nnn 0.250nnn 0.206nnn
(0.056) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060)
Desorptive capacity
No. of commercial alliances 0.017nn 0.032nnn 0.030nnn
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
No. of co-authoring institutions of scientific publications 0.015 0.008 0.006
(0.102) (0.102) (0.104)
No. of Commercial alliancesNo. of Co-authoring institutions of scientific publications 0.009nn 0.009nn
(0.003) (0.003)
Scale of R&D project 0.056nnn
(0.013)
Scale of R&D project2 0.001nn
(0.000)
QIC 3984.844 3397.978 3158.881 3113.362 3097.404
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations¼1458; Number of firms¼180; Observation per firm: Min¼1, Avg¼8.1, Max¼14. Observation period:
1990–2008. Nineteen calendar-year dummies are also included in all models, but not listed in the table. (Two tailed).
n po0.1
nn po0.05
nnn po0.01
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quadratic term for the scale of R&D portfolio are added into the
regression model. This continues to improve the model fit
(ΔQIC¼15.958). The positive sign of the linear term and nega-
tive sign of the squared term confirm our prediction. As indicated
by Fig. 1, the positive effect of the size of R&D portfolio on the
number of new out-licensing deals rises steadily with an increase
in the size of a firm’s R&D portfolio, and reaches its peak when the
firm has a portfolio of 23 R&D projects, after which the positive
effect starts to decline. This pattern supports the argument in H5,
which suggests an inverted U shape between size of R&D portfolio
and the number of out-licensing deals.
We undertook additional analysis to explore whether the
inverted U shape effect we found is driven by the functional form
of our modelling procedure or if it is also reflected in the under-
lying data. We therefore conducted model free analysis, plotting
the number of out-licensing deals against the total number of R&D
projects for each observation in our dataset. This analysis is
reported in Fig. 2, from which we observe the pattern of this
relationship as being an inverted U-shape effect. Observations rise,
thin out and then decline.
We estimated alternative models to validate the robustness of the
reported results. First, to better understand the implications of some
of the firms developing drugs of their own, we estimated models in
which we interacted the theoretical variables with the drug dummy
variable. None of these interaction effects was significant. Second, we
re-estimated the model using different knowledge depreciation
parameters in reasonable ranges around 20%, but this did not affect
the results either. Third, we explored the presence of interaction
effects between several of the variables included in the model, such
as: alliance portfolios and technological breadth, status, and patents.
These interaction effects were not significant however, nor did they
increase the explanatory power of the model, or affect the substance
of the conclusions derived above. Fourth, we included 19-year
dummy variables to account for industry shocks during the period
we studied. In particular, we looked for a significant effect during the
years when there were powerful shocks in the biotechnology
industry. However, none of the time dummies was significant and
no other results were affected. Fifth, we have done a robustness
check where we let the stock measures of all firms build for a period
of four or five years, and the substantive results remain robust. Sixth,
we conducted additional analyses by asking the question: How do
types of alliance partners (commercial versus noncommercial alli-
ance partners) affect status development (measured by two vari-
ables: paper citations and patent citations). As illustrated in Table 3,
one interesting result is that a greater number of commercial alliance
leads to higher status measured by patent citations. No other effects
are significant except for lagged dependent variables which suggest
the past status of firms positively influence their current status.
Seventh, we conducted additional analyses by asking the
question: How do types of alliance partners (i.e., commercial
versus noncommercial alliance) affect the learning opportunities
of firms (we use total number of R&D projects as a proxy for
leaning opportunities). The results in Table 4 suggest that number
of commercial alliances positively contribute to learning opportu-
nities, and for the number of non-commercial alliances the result
is not significant.
Eighth, we further consider the impact of different types of
alliances, the number of partners within each alliance and the national
contexts of the focal firms. To do so, we look into more fined-tuned
features of alliance by distinguishing between alliance consisting of
biopharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical firms, and alliance consist-
ing of biopharmaceutical and pharmaceutical firms, and number of
partners within each alliance. We added to our Model 0 the following
variables: (1) no. of biopharmaceutical-biopharmaceutical alliance,
Fig. 1. The inverted-U effect of the size of R&D portfolios on the number of new
licensing deals
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Fig. 2. Model free analysis of the inverted U shape.
Table 3
Change in status associated with types of alliances.
DV¼Ln
(Papercitationsþ1)
DV¼Ln
(Patentcitationsþ1)
No. of commercial alliance 0.0003 (0.0034) 0.011nnn (0.003)
No. of non-commercial
alliance
0.003 (0.018) 0.019 (0.018)
Lagged DV 1.022nnn (0.025) 0.612nnn (0.031)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Total R2 0.937 0.737
Note: Standard errors in brackets.
nnn po0.01.
Table 4
Learning opportunities associated with types of alliances.
DV¼Learning opportunities (total number of R&D projects)
No. of commercial alliance 0.049nn (0.019)
No. of non-commercial alliance 0.039 (0.094)
Lagged DV 0.631nnn (0.023)
Firm fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
Total R2 0.84
Note: Standard errors in brackets.
nn po0.05
nnn po0.01.
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(2) no. of biopharmaceutical-pharmaceutical alliance, (3) no. of multi-
ple partners, and (4) 11 countries dummies for the sample firms. None
of the effects of these new variables are significant. What is intriguing
here is that the country dummies are not significant. One of the
reasons contributing to the uniformity of the firms on this issue could
be that the firms have strong international presence.
7. Discussion and conclusion
Outbound open innovation opens up the innovation process to
external knowledge exploitation (Mortara and Minshall, 2011) and
brings about both economic and nonmonetary benefits (Arora
et al., 2001; Grindley and Teece, 1997). While considerable amount
of previous research has focused on licensing as an additional
source of revenue for large, established firms, often in the context
of international expansion (Fosfuri, 2006; Kotabe et al., 1996),
there has been little systematic study on the specific out-licensing
challenges faced by entrepreneurial firms which often have not
fully integrated their technologies into products. Therefore, the
combined findings of this study provide a better understanding of
why some entrepreneurial firms obtain a higher number of out-
licensing deals than others. Our work has contributed to the
literature on outbound open innovation in three ways, each of
which we discuss below: the relationship between out-licensing
and social status in public and private knowledge domains, failure
experience, and the factors that directly influence a firm’s ability
to out-license knowledge.
Our first contribution is about the understanding of external
knowledge exploitation and complement important aspects of
literatures on outbound open innovation and desorptive capacity,
offering empirically rich insights for bio-pharmaceutical firms into
the drivers of the volume of out-licensing deals and the effective-
ness of outbound open innovation (Huizingh, 2011).
We clarify whether social status helps entrepreneurial ventures
overcome market imperfection and information asymmetry in
out-licensing, and further illustrate the importance of specific
aspects of social status-building in this process. Prior literature
has argued that recognition of a firm’s scientific knowledge base in
the form of public citation by other knowledge producers, be that
basic science published in journals or patented knowledge with
private property rights, is an indication of the strength of a firm’s
technological capabilities (Gittelman and Kogut, 2003). We
advance this literature by demonstrating that status in both
spheres of knowledge does not equally attract out-licensing
partners, which is an important route for the commercialization
of an entrepreneurial firm’s knowledge base. Social status attached
to a firm’s pool of private knowledge, or patent citations, is
associated with increased out-licensing deals, whilst social status
attached to public knowledge, or paper citations, is not. Our study
also demonstrates that the same relationship exists for desorptive
capacity; greater numbers of prior commercial alliances are
associated with higher levels of out-licensing, whilst co-
authoring with institutions on scientific publications is not. Thus,
out-licensing deals are driven both by recognition of the impor-
tance of a firm’s private property rights, or patents, and by its prior
experience in managing commercial alliances. Out-licensing part-
ners are attracted to a record of success in a firm’s ability both to
manage alliance relationships, as evidenced by its volume of prior
commercial partnerships, and to feed into the deal, not only
intellectual property rights but also patents that are recognised
in the scientific community as being of high importance and hence
potential value.
The literature on the relationship between R&D failure and
performance reports both positive and negative relationships with
performance. Positive relationships between failure experience
and firm performance have been associated with improvements
in exploration for new technology and cases where learning is
vicarious (Girotra et al., 2007). Similarly, failure may trigger
reflection, and hence improvements in a firm’s organizational
adaptation and reliability, which are associated with organiza-
tional success (Carmeli and Schaubroeck, 2008; Madsen and Desai,
2010). In the bio-pharmaceutical industry it has been found that
failure experience stimulates search for new technologies but not
new markets (Su and McNamara, 2012). At the same time, there is
also evidence of bias against supporting failure with future
resource commitments. Failure in collaboration, for example, is
associated with negative organizational performance conse-
quences (Lhuillery and Pfister, 2009). Furthermore, financial mar-
kets respond negatively to announcements of failure in the new
product development process and do so in an asymmetric manner,
where stock-market declines in response to failure announce-
ments are many times greater than the positive response to
announcements of success in new product development (Sharma
and Lacey, 2004).
Taken together, we therefore contribute to the literature on the
relationship between failure experience and firm performance,
demonstrating that failure experience in R&D is negatively asso-
ciated with out-licensing deals. Our study adds to the evidence
that whilst failure experience may be associated with the explora-
tion of new technologies, it has a negative relationship with the
exploitation and commercialization of technologies. Out-licensing
partners are looking for technologies that can be transformed into
commercial success in the near future, and failure in clinical
experience suggests a return to search for new technologies and
a reduced likelihood of commercial success from the current stock
of technology in the short term. In the mid- and long-term,
repurposing strategy of failures may yet be found to enhance the
opportunity in out-licensing. A major focus for drug repurposing is
to re-pursue drug candidates that did not succeed in advanced
clinical trials, for reasons other than safety, for potential new
therapeutic applications (Roy et al. 2011). Drug repurposing is
cost-effective as these compounds have the necessary safety
profile, and further investigation requires identification of new
therapeutic indications (Roy et al. 2011).
In this research, we take a dynamic view of desorptive capacity
by examining an entrepreneurial venture’s learning process both
internally, from its own technology trajectory, and externally,
through inter-organizational alliances. Prior outbound open inno-
vation studies do not account for the heterogeneity of technology
and experiences of both success and failure with R&D observed in
our study. We demonstrate the contingency effect of a firm’s
external learning as it builds up its desorptive capacity namely,
that co-authoring partners in scientific publications negatively
moderate the effect of commercial alliances on the number of out-
licensing deals the firm secures. Recent work, that has addressed
the issue of interdependencies in alliance portfolios, provides
support for the portfolio effect idea (Vassolo et al., 2004). Surpris-
ingly, however, there is a lack of empirical studies on the
subject. Therefore, our finding on the interdependence relation-
ship between alliances within the private and public knowledge
domains contributes to this area of research.
Concerning manager-oriented insights, we find that the social
status of a licensor in the private knowledge domain positively
influences the number of new out-licensing deals the firm can obtain,
as the firm's status has informational value to licensees. This implies
that firm strategies for reducing information asymmetries may reduce
the risks of trading technology and hence increase the attractiveness
of such firms in the market for technological out-licensing deals.
However, the high status which an entrepreneurial firm can achieve in
the public knowledge domain may have little impact on how the firm
will be rewarded in the private knowledge domain. The insignificant
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effect of social status in the public knowledge domain points to a
paradox in technology markets. Publishing a large number of highly-
cited scientific papers can be useful in terms of bridging the informa-
tion asymmetry with potential licensees, but it can also signal a lack of
concern for confidentiality. Yet, confidentiality is essential because of
the innate value of rivalry of intellectual property, suggesting that
disclosing an idea to some, substantially reduces its value for others
(Gans and Stern, 2010). In licensing exchange, firms ought to strike a
balance between informing the market and assuring confidentiality.
Too many publications by a firm on a certain topic may also damage
the originality of an innovative idea, which in turn can raise concerns
about related technologies that the firm intends to license out.
In this paper, we find that if an entrepreneurial firm has a large
number or percentage of failed R&D projects behind it, such
failures may negatively impact the total number of its out-
licensing deals. Out-licensing partners are likely to be biased
towards a recent track record of success and wary of undertaking
deals with entrepreneurial firms that have a recent track record of
clinical failures. Therefore, entrepreneurial firms should be cau-
tious in taking on a large number of high-risk projects as these
may cause potential damage to their reputation, negatively affect-
ing external knowledge exploitation.
In addition, we find that the alliances in the public knowledge
domain negatively moderate the positive effect from alliances in
the private knowledge domain on the number of out-licensing
deals. The findings support the theories on entrepreneurial firms
in explaining strategic actions (Rao et al., 2008). In particular,
conflict between partners occurs when they affect one another
negatively because they are members of competing networks and/
or are strong rivals in an industry and/or promote competing
technologies (Wassmer, 2010). Entrepreneurial firms should mini-
mize these potential conflicts in their alliance portfolios.
Finally, because of the high degree of uncertainty affecting drug
discovery, entrepreneurial firms may find it quite tempting to carry on
a large number of projects so that they can learn through trial and
error to build stronger desorptive capacity. However, our examination
reveals that an inverted U shape exists between the total number of
R&D projects and the number of out-licensing deals. Such an effect can
be explained by the knowledge intensive nature of the out-licensing
process, the diversity of tasks involved and the varying conditions of
uncertainty where the commercialisation may occur (Chesbrough,
2003), which require individuals to be central actors of its implemen-
tation. Large firms, such as Procter & Gamble (Palomeras, 2007), have
managed to substantially increase licensing revenues only after
establishing a panel of multidisciplinary technologists, responsible
for identifying applications for proprietary technologies. However, for
entrepreneurial firms, organization of out-licensing tasks can be a
challenge, since these tasks are shaped by the volume of out-licensing
transactions, the stage of development of the technology being
commercialized and the competitive threats due to the deal (Bianchi
et al., 2011b). Therefore, working on too many tasks simultaneously
causes less attention to be paid to any individual task (Navon and
Gopher, 1979). Likewise, when multiple tasks need the same resources
at the same time, bottlenecks arise, and all tasks are impaired (DeJong,
1993; Pashler, 1994). Recent study has also found that the difficulty in
finding partners is the primary factor behind a substantial number of
unlicensed patents, despite the owners’ willingness to license out
(Kani and Motohashi, 2012). Overall, these arguments suggest that
processing too many tasks at the same time is likely to lead to lower
performance output in innovation.
As with many early studies in an area, this research has several
limitations, some of which offer fruitful avenues for further research.
First, because of data limitations, we examine out-licensing behaviours
in the bio-pharmaceutical industry alone. While many of the argu-
ments might also hold for medium and large organizations, further
research is needed to test the hypotheses in other contexts, such as
electronics and telecommunications. Second, in our examination of
desorptive capacity, we have included both firms’ internal factors
(R&D portfolios) and external factors (alliance portfolios). However, we
were unable to conduct a detailed analysis of the learning process
where firms build on market knowledge to help out-licensing. Future
studies may explore the construct of desorptive capacity and its
impact on outbound innovation in more depth. A longitudinal survey
may prove useful in this regard.
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